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• Address the structural bottlenecks impeding the effective implementation of an appropriate policy mix 
by African LICs. A key focus area is ensuring the independence of monetary and debt management 
authorities with a view to achieving fiscal sustainability and controlling inflation. 
• Implement a data-driven approach to policy formulation in the context of COVID-19 economic 
management, as this will streamline recovery efforts and enhance results.
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The COVID-19 Macroeconomic Policy Response in Africa (CoMPRA) project was 
developed following a call for rapid response policy research into the COVID-19 
pandemic by the IDRC. The project’s overall goal is to inform macroeconomic 
policy development in response to the COVID-19 pandemic by low and middle-
income countries (LMICs) and development partners that results in more 
inclusive, climate-resilient, effective and gender-responsive measures through 
evidence-based research. This will help to mitigate COVID-19’s social and 
economic impact, promote recovery from the pandemic in the short term 
and position LMICs in the longer term for a more climate-resilient, sustainable 
and stable future. The CoMPRA project will focus broadly on African countries 
and specifically on six countries (Benin, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria 
and South Africa). SAIIA and CSEA, as the lead implementing partners for this 
project, also work with think tank partners in these countries. 
• Maintain official development assistance as an intervention during the COVID-19 economic 
recovery phase as it is crucial for those LICs (particularly fragile states) with limited capacity 
to mobilise their own domestic resources. 
• Address structural weaknesses in key sectors, many of which have been exposed by COVID-19. 
Priority should be given to broadening the digital economy as well as financial and social 
inclusion, which will have significant, long-term benefits. 
Our Donor 
This project is supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).  
The IDRC is a Canadian federal Crown corporation. It is part of Canada’s foreign 
affairs and development efforts and invests in knowledge, innovation, and solutions 
to improve the lives of people in the developing world.
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Executive summary 
This brief assesses the policy responses to COVID-19 among low-income countries (LICs) in Africa. 
While LICs have adopted expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the face of economic 
lockdown, as well as other mitigation strategies, the scale and quality of such responses have 
been modest compared with those of emerging and middle-income countries. Policy instruments 
have also varied across countries, in line with the level of development of domestic financial 
markets and the extent of digital inclusion. Pre-pandemic economic challenges, such as limited 
fiscal space, high debt levels and inflation, have also contributed to countries’ weak economic 
responses. External financing has been crucial for LICs’ ability to respond to the pandemic, 
but, is still inadequate given the huge financial gap that exists. As LICs move from the relief to 
the recovery phase of COVID-19 economic management, a rethinking of economic responses 
is crucial both to bring about a swift recovery and to minimise the catastrophic impact of 
COVID-19 on recent developmental gains. 
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating effect on both developed and developing 
countries. While the burden of disease and the health implications have been felt most acutely 
by developed and a few emerging economies, all countries have experienced serious economic 
consequences. At the peak of the crisis, 161 countries were under some form of lockdown, which 
put a severe strain on their economic and trade activities. Developed countries used their 
enormous financial capacity to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic with expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies and social palliatives. By April 2020, the US alone had spent over $6 trillion in 
COVID-19 response measures, while the EU later introduced a $500 billion stimulus package. 
Low-income countries (LICs) in Africa, in turn, responded to the health crisis with lockdowns and 
the heavy curtailment of economic activity. However, the scale and scope of their mitigation 
strategies paled in comparison with those of most developed countries. The total COVID-19 
budget of African countries stood at $37.8 billion in April 2020, with South Africa and Egypt 
responsible for 84% of that amount. This implies that most LICs lack the financial capacity to 
respond meaningfully to the pandemic. In addition, prospects of securing external financial 
assistance are limited, given that every country is facing a similar crisis.
With many countries already reopening their economies and focusing on recovery efforts, 
important questions need to be asked about the African LIC experience. In the initial phase of 
the crisis, how did African LICs use the various policy tools at their disposal (fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate) to effectively manage the crisis? How did their economic responses evolve 
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– especially compared with their responses to past economic 
challenges, like the global financial crisis (GFC)? What 
worked, where did it work and why did it work? Looking 
ahead, what crucial lessons have LICs learned from economic 
recovery efforts? This policy brief delves into these important 
questions.  
Economic policy responses 
to COVID-19 among LICs  
in Africa
While public health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic 
have followed a similar pattern of public awareness creation, 
testing, tracking, therapeutic management of those infected 
and physical restrictions (lockdowns and shutdowns) to 
curb its spread, economic responses have varied significantly 
across countries, given different fiscal space and pre-
pandemic economic fundamentals. 
Economic responses have cut across three policy domains: 
fiscal; monetary and macro-financial; and exchange rate/
balance of payments. Economic responses have also been 
shifting as the pandemic has progressed. At the onset, the 
focus of economic policy responses was on delivering relief to 
vulnerable populations and those in precarious employment 
whose livelihoods were affected by the lockdowns. Now, 
with a better understanding of the patterns and effects of 
the disease, more countries in Africa are moving towards 
reopening their economies and directing their economic 
policy responses at recovery, following the initial economic 
shocks. 
Below we briefly enumerate these policy responses among 
LICs in Africa and compare how these interventions diverge 
from past responses to economic crises, notably the 2007–
2008 GFC. 
“Economic responses have 
cut across three policy 
domains: fiscal; monetary 
and macro-financial; and 
exchange rate/balance 
of payments. Economic 
responses have also been 
shifting as the pandemic 
has progressed”
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Fiscal policy: This includes economy-wide and sectoral 
interventions using taxation/subsidy, public expenditure and 
deficit-financing instruments. The first line of intervention in 
many countries is emergency budget support for the health 
sector and the scaling up of social protection for vulnerable 
households in the form of direct cash transfers, a debt 
moratorium, and financial support for small and medium-
sized enterprises and the informal sector. In many cases, 
expenditure has been reprioritised to focus on immediate 
needs in the health sector. For countries with less fiscal 
space, interventions have taken the form of taxation-related 
measures, such as tax relief and utility bill freezes, among 
others. There has also been an increase in deficit financing or 
drawing down savings.
Most LICs in Africa have used one or more forms of the 
fiscal policy instruments mentioned above. The most 
common fiscal policy instrument has been budget support 
for the health sector, through either reprioritisation or an 
expansionary policy. Only a few LICs have implemented 
social transfer programmes/support for households or firms. 
Moreover, the size of countries’ fiscal stimulus has been small, 
generally ranging from 1% to 2% of gross domestic product 
(GDP).1 The few exceptions among LICs are Senegal, Niger, 
Mozambique and Namibia, whose fiscal stimulus injections 
have amounted to more than 4% of GDP. Other limiting 
factors in terms of fiscal response (which were evident 
before the pandemic) are the absence of a social register, 
especially for urban residents who have carried practically 
the full burden of the lockdown, and low financial and 
digital inclusion, which has constrained the distribution of 
support. Despite these constraints, LICs have still managed to 
introduce several innovative and cost-effective interventions, 
such as tax relief (Senegal and Madagascar), a utility bill 
1 African Development Bank, African Economic Outlook 2020: Developing Africa’s Workforce for 
the Future (Abidjan: AfDB, 2020), https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-economic-
outlook-2020.
“The most common fiscal 
policy instrument has 
been budget support for 
the health sector, through 
either reprioritisation or an 
expansionary policy. Only a 
few LICs have implemented 
social transfer programmes”
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freeze and a waiver of fees for basic services (Niger), and the 
distribution of food aid (Senegal and Liberia).2
On the revenue side, the pandemic has affected the 
economic performance of most African countries, with 
government revenue projected to decline by more than 
12% in 2020. Domestic resources thus make a limited 
contribution to government policy responses. However, early 
debt forgiveness and credit facilities granted by donors have 
helped to expand fiscal space in many LICs on the continent. 
Monetary and macro-financial policy: Central banks, 
in a coordinated effort with fiscal authorities, have used 
expansionary monetary policy, in the form of increased 
money supply, through traditional, open-market operations 
as well as quantitative easing. Another tool that central 
banks are deploying is macro-financial assistance, which 
comprises medium/long-term loans or grants to businesses 
or households, as a way of cutting through the commercial 
banking system. In addition, there are support measures for 
commercial banks and other financial intermediaries that 
take the form of extended credit lines, higher liquidity and 
extensions to collateral frameworks.  However, monetary 
policy interventions face some risks when it comes to 
managing the trade-off between growth-enhancing policies 
and inflation. Central banks are also using moral suasion 
and forward guidance to encourage commitment to specific 
policy directions in a bid to stabilise the financial system. 
Expansionary monetary policy is by far the most common 
economic response deployed by African LICs.3 One reason 
for its popularity is that the fiscal space in most countries 
is heavily constrained owing to high debt levels and weak 
revenue flows. A change in interest rate policy is another 
widely used instrument. Countries in the Economic 
2 AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2020; Cesar Calderon et al., “An Analysis of Issues Shaping 
Africa’s Economic Future”, Africa’s Pulse, No. 21, Spring 2020, https://elibrary.worldbank.org/
doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-1568-3.
3 AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2020.  
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Community of Central African States, which have limited control over interest rate policy, mostly 
rely on injections of liquidity and extended deadlines for the repayment of loan securities held by 
credit institutions. Nine of the LICs in Africa implement no monetary policies, according to the 
World Bank.4 These are mostly countries whose weak financial markets make the application of 
monetary policy difficult. In many countries, too, the use and likely effectiveness of monetary 
policy is influenced by high inflation, which was evident before the pandemic. 
Exchange rate/balance of payments policy: The COVID-19 pandemic has affected demand 
patterns and global supply chains to the extent that they have disrupted foreign exchange 
earnings for many African LICs. The oil price crash that occurred during the pandemic generated 
an additional external shock for petro states and worsened foreign reserves. Some countries, like 
Nigeria, responded to this threat by changing the exchange rate regime or depreciating their 
currency.5 In addition, countries that lost control of inflation owing to their expansionary monetary 
policies used exchange rate policy as an alternative tool to address inflationary pressures. 
Among the LICs in Africa, only Zimbabwe has made an explicit change to its exchange rate 
policy, by moving from a flexible to a fixed exchange rate in the face of the country’s forex crisis. 
However, most countries’ monetary authorities are using forward guidance to win support for 
interventions in forex markets in cases of high volatility or significant currency depreciation. For 
example, the banks of Uganda, Comoros and Sierra Leone have committed to intervening in the 
foreign exchange market.6 In contrast, Angola, Eswatini and Nigeria (all lower-middle-income 
countries) have depreciated their currencies in response to COVID-induced economic shocks. 
LICs have recorded fewer cases of currency depreciation than the frontier economies in Africa. 
Overall, the exchange rate policy has not played a major role in LICs’ policy responses in recent 
months. 
Donor support for African LICs in the face of 
the COVID-19 pandemic 
Given the inadequate scale of domestic resources among LICs, the second layer of interventions 
has come in the form of donor support. This includes multilateral support from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), as well as 
4 Calderon et al., “An Analysis of Issues”.
5 International Monetary Fund, Policy Tracker, Policy Responses To COVID-19 (Washington DC: IMF, 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-
covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19.
6 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (Washington DC: World Bank, June 2020), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/232931588788046902/Global-
Economic-Prospects-June-2020-Analysis-SSA.pdf.
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bilateral interventions from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries 
and even countries in the Global South. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA)7 has collected detailed data on appeals for funding from developing countries 
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the total receipts so far. 
As shown in Figure 1, a financing gap (the difference between need and actual allocation) is 
observed for all LICs, but it varies across countries. For example, Somalia and the Central African 
Republic have received 60% and 54%, respectively, of their appeal funds, while Uganda and 
Tanzania have received only 5% and 7%, respectively. A notable trend is that fragile states receive 
a higher proportion of the funds for which they have appealed, which is an indication of the 
priority given to disadvantaged countries in terms of donor interventions.   
Debt relief and a moratorium on debt services are other forms of external support. The World 
Bank, the IMF, the G20, the AfDB and all Paris Club creditors granted debt relief to 18 LICs 
in Africa as part of the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust. The IMF also activated 
emergency lending facilities for African countries. China, in turn, introduced a series of debt relief 
and debt service suspension measures for African countries. However, with African countries 
having incurred more than $350 billion in debt, the debt forgiveness and relief measures 
represent modest support given LICs’ enormous financial needs. There are also concerns that 
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Figure 1 External funding gap for COVID-19 in selected LICs in Africa (2020) 
Note: CAR = Central African Republic, DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo 
Source:  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Aid Contributions 2020”, https://fts.unocha.org/ 
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creditors could in the future penalise those African countries 
requesting debt relief. Mutize notes that most African 
countries eligible for a debt moratorium have so far refused 
to apply because of the risk of credit rating downgrades.8  
There are also private philanthropic support measures. The 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has committed $1.6 billion 
over five years to ensure that the most vulnerable in the world 
can access a COVID-19 vaccine once developed. However, 
most philanthropic and bilateral support is aimed at health 
interventions, while economic support in many cases relies 
on the intervention of multilateral institutions. An analysis of 
trends in foreign aid and donor support shows that, in line 
with UNOCHA data, LICs in Africa have accessed some donor 
support, although this has been insufficient relative to their 
financial needs.  
Effectiveness of African 
LICs’ economic responses 
Given that the COVID-19 pandemic is still prevalent 
throughout the world, it is difficult to accurately gauge 
the effectiveness of various policy responses to date. 
Nevertheless, the policy interest that COVID-19 has stirred 
has prompted the capturing of much data using many 
indicators that have been useful in periodically tracking the 
virus’s economic and epidemiological effects. Elgin, Basbug 
and Yalaman9 developed an economic stimulus index to track 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy responses across 
countries. We used this index to assess the performance of 
LICs in Africa in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. We 
also compared the IMF’s projected growth rates among LICs, 
8 Misheck Mutize, “Why African Countries are Reluctant to Take Up COVID-19 Debt Relief”, 
The Conversation, July 28, 2020, https://theconversation.com/why-african-countries-are-
reluctant-to-take-up-covid-19-debt-relief-140643.`
9 Ceyhun Elgin, Gokce Basbug and Abdullah Yalaman, “Economic Policy Responses to a 
Pandemic: Developing the COVID-19 Economic Stimulus Index”, Covid Economics 1, no. 3 
(2020): 40–53.
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which are measures of the likely impact of COVID-19, to the actual growth rates in the first and 
second quarters of 2020. 
Furthermore, we correlated the stimulus index with key economic indicators prior to COVID-19 
to assess the factors driving the observed country-by-country differences in policy design. The 
variables examined included: debt level, inflation and revenue over five years (2015–19) prior to 
the pandemic. High debt levels might constrain effective policy responses because of limited 
fiscal space. A similar argument holds for revenue; as better income streams are key to being 
able to pursue a countercyclical policy. In addition, inflation reduces the extent to which the 
monetary authority can push for an expansionary policy. Lastly, we compared the stimulus index 
to the incidence of and deaths from COVID-19. The results are reported in the Appendix.
The analysis showed that the economic response has been weak across African LICs, with all 
countries (except Senegal) recording a negative score. Similarly, comparing the actual and 
projected growth rates revealed that many LICs’ growth rates have been worse than projected –
especially in the second quarter of 2020, which coincided with the peak of the COVID-19-induced 
lockdowns. We found the stimulus index to be positively correlated with the number of COVID-19 
cases, while the number of deaths showed a negative but nevertheless weak relationship. This 
suggests that countries’ response levels are driven by the incidence of the virus and not the  
death rate. 
Countries with high debt levels before the crisis had lower scores on the stimulus index, while 
those with high revenue levels had higher scores. This aligns with the argument that limited fiscal 
space constraints LICs’ macroeconomic responsiveness. In the same vein, the stimulus index is 
lower among countries with high inflation before the pandemic, again illustrating that a weak 
macroeconomic environment is a major constraint to effective policy responses to COVID-19. 
Overall, the weak economic response among LICs in Africa is a manifestation of past economic 
problems. This finding is supported by the literature on the importance of initial conditions for 
economic development.10  
Comparison of COVID-19 and GFC economic 
policy responses 
The COVID-19 crisis bears some resemblance to the GFC. For LICs, both came in the form of an 
external shock emanating from developed countries and transmitted through trade and the 
10 Hyun H Son and Nanak Kakwani, “Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: Initial Conditions Matter” (Working Paper 2, International Poverty 
Center, UN Development Programme, Washington DC, 2004), https://ipcig.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper2.pdf.
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economic interdependency among nations. The transmission 
mechanisms were also similar, with a decline in global trade, 
remittances, foreign aid and commodity prices dominating. 
However, the magnitude of COVID-19 and the speed with 
which it has unfolded have been much greater than those of 
the GFC. In just three months, COVID-19 managed to turn 
around the 2020 global economic outlook (output) from 
more than 3% to -3%.
With both the GFC and COVID-19, the majority of LICs in 
Africa pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
to absorb the economic shock. However, they had more 
space to use fiscal policy at the time of the GFC, as the crisis 
came after the implementation of the LIC debt forgiveness 
programmes. Furthermore, non-resource-dependent 
countries were only marginally affected by the GFC, with 
some even benefiting from lower fuel and food prices.11 In 
fact, economic growth declined only slightly among African 
LICs during the crisis. 
During the GFC, LICs responded to changes with macro-
prudential policies to strengthen the financial system. The 
response to COVID-19 has in turn centred on strengthening 
the health system and developing social security facilities for 
vulnerable groups. The donor support measures during the 
two crises were similar. In terms of development assistance, 
priority was given to fragile and post-conflict states. 
Multilateral institutions also introduced special facilities 
that African countries could tap, with the IMF, World Bank 
and AfDB providing facilities to improve trade, the financial 
system, foreign reserves and infrastructure. In addition, the 
IMF created Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to the value of 
$250 billion, which countries can access up to their IMF quota 
share. This has proved useful for LICs during the COVID-19 
crisis. However, policy tools like debt forgiveness were of 
limited use during the GFC compared to their value during 
11 Alexis Arieff, Martin A Weiss and Vivian C Jones, The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Global Policy Responses, Report for Congress (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40778.pdf.
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COVID-19. Overall, there were inadequate funds for African LICs to effectively respond to the  
two crises.
In terms of differences in economic policy responses, social palliatives were used in very few 
African countries during the GFC. Bilateral support was much more prevalent – although 
complementary to the multilateral support – during the GFC. In contrast, donor support for 
COVID-19 has largely come from multilateral institutions. In addition, COVID-19 has been greeted 
by a better-capacitated financial system (ie, capital reserves), whereas the financial sector was 
found wanting during the 2007–2008 GFC. Lastly, in African countries’ responses to the GFC, 
regional cooperation had a stronger role to play, especially in the area of monetary policy. African 
governments set up the Committee of Central and Regional Bank Governors (C-10) at the 
beginning of the GFC. During COVID-19, while there have been areas of coordination in health 
policy (eg, the Africa Taskforce for Novel Coronavirus) and fiscal policy (eg, the creation of a 
Continental Solidarity Anti-COVID-19 Fund), monetary policy has been less coordinated among 
African countries. 
However, the economic impact of COVID-19 on LICs is expected to be greater owing to the 
slowdown in trade and economic activity, and unequal access to COVID-19 therapeutic 
treatments. In addition, while poverty levels did not rise in the face of the GFC, most research 
findings point to a sharp increase in poverty rates (for the first time in three decades) owing to 
COVID-19.12
Emerging issues and lessons for  
economic recovery
A gradual reopening of the economy has been evident in all LICs. At the time of writing, the 
policy focus was centred on recovery efforts. In this phase, fiscal and monetary policies will 
remain not only relevant but also crucial. However, several pertinent issues and lessons from the 
relief phase should guide recovery efforts and policy responses. 
Inability to harness multiple policy instruments: Unlike high-income and middle-income 
countries that simultaneously deployed fiscal and monetary policies in response to COVID-19, 
most African LICs have been able to effectively use only one instrument. High debt levels and 
inflation, as well as other structural issues, have limited policy options. In the long run, the 
structural bottlenecks impeding the effective implementation of economic policies by LICs 
12 Andy Sumner, Chris Hoy and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez, “Estimates of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty”, UN World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (April 2020): 800–9.
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need to be addressed using a more nuanced approach. This 
will require reforming economic institutions and processes 
to drive inclusive growth. An important focus area is 
the independence of monetary and debt management 
authorities, which is crucial for fiscal sustainability and 
controlling inflation. 
Importance of a switch to a data-driven approach:  
The initial response to the pandemic in most African 
countries was simply to copy the template from developed 
countries.13 For example, lockdowns and economic shutdowns 
were reversed in many countries after recognition of the 
limited capacity of governments to provide palliatives. This 
led to a more data-driven approach, which is consistent 
with countries’ economic structure and disease prevalence. 
Similarly, recovery efforts should be anchored on the same 
data-driven approach, with the interests of vulnerable 
populations prioritised.  
Need for better leveraging of international cooperation: 
Official development assistance plays a prominent role 
in African LICs’ economic responses. It will continue to be 
crucial for COVID-19 recovery efforts, especially in the case of 
fragile states that have limited capacity to mobilise domestic 
resources and are heavily reliant on external support and 
trade. Nevertheless, it is important to look inwards to the 
Global South and other countries in Africa. Intra-Africa trade 
is one area that LICs can leverage for stronger resource 
mobilisation and growth. For example, the opportunities 
created by the African Continental Free Trade Area, which is 
expected to commence on 1 January 2021, can be tapped  
by LICs. 
Rethinking of economic structure: Some of the structural 
hurdles facing LICs in Africa, which COVID-19 has exposed, 
include weaknesses in the digital economy, a lack of financial 
and social inclusion, and poorly developed domestic financial 
13 World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects”.
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markets. Also, contrary to conventional economic thinking, many LICs follow pro-cyclical policies – 
ie, not saving during an economic boom – which a countries’ preparedness and ability to respond 
effectively to a sudden economic crisis. A long-term process to address these failures needs to be 
set in motion as part of countries’ broad recovery plans.
Conclusion 
This analysis has revealed that economic policy responses among LICs in Africa have been sub-
optimal in the face of existing, pre-pandemic economic challenges. These challenges, which 
have simply been amplified by the crisis, include poor fiscal positions, deficiencies in human 
capital development, and a general absence of crucial hard and soft infrastructure. It is therefore 
important that recovery efforts are used as a springboard for long-term development across the 
continent. Indeed, a holistic and comprehensive intervention in these areas should be front and 
centre of the conversation on economic recovery going forward.
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Appendix
Sources: IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database”, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2020/October; Ceyhun Elgin, 
Gokce Basbug and Abdullah Yalaman, “Economic Policy Responses to a Pandemic: Developing the COVID-19 Economic Stimulus Index”, Covid Economics 1, 
no. 3 (2020): 40–53 
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Figure 5 Stimulus index vs COVID-19 cases








Figure 4 Stimulus index vs COVID-19 deaths








Figure 6 Stimulus index vs government debt
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Sources: Elgin, Basbug and Yalaman, “Economic Policy Responses”; World Bank, “World Development Indicators”, 2020, https://databank.worldbank.org/
source/world-development-indicators; IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database”; Statista, “Number of Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Cases by Country 
(2020)”, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1093256/novel-coronavirus-2019ncov-deaths-worldwide-by-country/
Figure 9 Stimulus index vs primary deficit








Figure 8 Stimulus index vs inflation








Figure 7 Stimulus index vs government revenue
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